Case Comment: A Critical Analysis Of G.J. Raja V. Tejraj Surana (2019)
- IJLLR Journal
- Jan 7, 2024
- 1 min read
Maanyaa Gupta, BBA LLB, Jindal Global Law School
This comment examines the case at hand1, highlighting the court's identification of legal principles but critiquing its reasoning. It contends that an alternative ruling would have ensured a more consistent application of the law and upheld principles of equity. The critique is offered with respect and aims to respectfully analyse the court's decision.
Facts of the Case:
The complaint in this case was filed in 2016, under Section 138 of the NI Act2, and the trial took place in 2019 after the introduction of Section 143-A in 2018. Section 143-A empowers the court to order interim compensation before determining the accused's guilt. The Supreme Court on the question of application of the section concluded that it should be applied prospectively, only to offenses committed after its introduction.
Analysis of Court's Reasoning:
The court referenced various legal precedents to classify Section 143-A as substantive law due to its establishment of new liabilities and disabilities. However, it overlooked a critical aspect: the obligation to pay interim compensation is not absolute. The court overlooked the discretionary use of "may" in Section 143-A, both in compelling the accused to pay compensation and in enforcing dues through coercive means. Applying the law retrospectively wouldn't obligate every accused to pay, as liability is case-specific, particularly when serious circumstances or prima facie evidence necessitate compensating the aggrieved party for the bounced check. This purposive interpretation of the legislative intent, in my opinion, was missing in the judgment.
