Criminality Of Marital Rape In India Through The Lens Of Antonin Scalia And Arie Rosen
- IJLLR Journal
- 2 hours ago
- 2 min read
Sriram Rajasagi, O.P. Jindal Global University, Jindal Global Law School
Background
The case of Hrishikesh Sahoo vs State of Karnataka has been widely discussed among proponents and critics alike, primarily for its notorious disregard of the textual provisions of the law, leading to a groundless exercise of judicial powers. The case dealt with the question of criminality of marital rape, when the very same is explicitly exempted from punishment by the law and one such instance where the Court relied on a interpretative process aiming for a “just” outcome while ignoring the clear wording of the statute and its intent.
The accused, one Mr. Hrishikesh Sahoo contented, in a writ petition filed before the Court, that the he cannot be prosecuted for the charge under Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code, as the act of marital rape, under the grounds specified by the Section, is from criminality. This exception, resulting in gross injustice to the victims and preventing them from seeking justice, was lambasted by the Court for acting as an undeserved protection to the offenders culpable of such heinous acts. Solely existing due to the legislature's insistence on upholding near- draconian standards of the institution of marriage, this exception has been up for contention for decades in the courts of justice in India.
Justice Nagaprasanna's approach - An overreach of justice?
The judgment authored by Justice Nagaprasanna, the lone judge presiding over the case at the High Court of Karnataka from its very foundation, identifies a clear moral standing upon which the Court was adjudicating the matter. In Para 1, the judge drives home the severity of the acts committed by the accused, with the help of colorful adjectives, cannot be absolved by such an exemption that clearly causes prejudice to the victims.
The Bench does not deny that the exemption is entrenched specifically to tackle such situations and states that the IPC statute has been clear in its wording and intent, deriving itself from age- old British era laws such as Macaulay's Code. But the judge also emphasizes that the pervasiveness of this regressive concept of coverture into contemporary laws defeats the purpose of the constitutional protections guaranteed to every citizen of the country, man and woman alike. Using the interpretative method of competing interests, the bench aimed to achieve the most ‘sensible’ result. This prudential method values the particular facts presented over established legal principle.
