Governor As The Agent Of The Centre: Constitutional Or Political Bias?
- IJLLR Journal
- May 8
- 1 min read
Aryan Yadav, Gujarat National Law University
ABSTRACT
The role of the Governor in the Indian constitutional framework has long been a focal point of scholarly and political scrutiny, primarily due to the discretionary powers vested in the office and their application in politically sensitive situations. Although the Constitution envisages the Governor as a neutral and apolitical constitutional authority, there is a growing perception that the office has been increasingly politicized and functions as an agent of the Centre, raising concerns about federal imbalance and democratic accountability. This is particularly evident during episodes of government formation, the dismissal of elected governments, and the recommendation for the imposition of President’s Rule under Article 356.
The 2019 Maharashtra political crisis, culminating in the Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary case, brought renewed attention to the alleged misuse of gubernatorial discretion, highlighting the tension between constitutional mandate and political expediency. Through a critical analysis of constitutional provisions, judicial pronouncements, and key commission reports—including the Sarkaria Commission, Punchhi Commission, and the 2005 Administrative Reforms Commission—this research examines whether the Governor’s actions are rooted in constitutional fidelity or driven by political bias. It further assesses the adequacy of judicial safeguards in curbing such misuse and evaluates the implementation and effectiveness of the various recommendations aimed at reforming the gubernatorial role. By doing so, the study seeks to contribute to the broader discourse on Centre-State relations, constitutional morality, and the need for institutional reforms to ensure that the Governor’s office remains an impartial instrument of governance rather than a tool of political manoeuvring.
