Gubernatorial Power And Democratic Balance: Analysis Of State Of Tamil Nadu V. Governor Of Tamil Nadu (2025 INSC 481) And Its Implications For Centre–State Relations
- IJLLR Journal
- 7 hours ago
- 1 min read
Vikrant Singh, LLM, GGSIPU, Delhi
ABSTRACT
This study examines the scope and limits of gubernatorial power in India through a focused analysis of State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, situating the case within the broader constitutional framework of democratic balance and Centre–State relations. The office of the Governor, conceived as a constitutional link between the Union and the States, has increasingly become a site of contestation, particularly in matters relating to assent to bills, discretionary powers, and perceived political neutrality. The paper analyses the factual background, constitutional provisions, and judicial reasoning in the case, with particular attention to Articles-153, Article-163, Article-200, and Article-201 of the Constitution of India.
It evaluates how the Court’s interpretation recalibrates the Governor’s role from a discretionary authority to one constrained by constitutional morality, cooperative federalism, and democratic accountability. The study further assesses the implications of the judgment for legislative autonomy of States, limits on executive delay, and the evolving jurisprudence on federal balance. By contextualizing the decision alongside prior Supreme Court rulings on gubernatorial discretion, the argues that the case marks a significant judicial effort to prevent constitutional functionaries from undermining elected state governments.
The findings contribute to contemporary debates on federalism by highlighting how judicial oversight can strengthen democratic governance while preserving the constitutional equilibrium between the Centre and the States.
Keywords: Gubernational Discretion, Democratic Balance, Centre- State Relation, Cooperative Relation, Constitutional federalism, Assent to Bill, State Autonomy, Judicial Review
