Judicial Intervention And Electoral Reform: The Electoral Bond Scheme In Light Of Transformative Constitutionalism
- IJLLR Journal
- Aug 29
- 1 min read
Udishna Bhattacharjee, LL.M., Department of Law, University of North Bengal
ABSTRACT
“Political tyranny is nothing compared to the social tyranny and a reformer who defies a society is a more courageous man than a politician who defies Government.”
-Dr. B. R. Ambedkar
This paper examines transformative Constitutionalism within India’s electoral system, a democratic setup critically reliant on principles like an independent judiciary, free legislative elections, and governmental accountability. Since the 17th century, elections have been central to modern representative democracies. In India, free and fair elections, indispensable for democracy, are safeguarded by the autonomous Election Commission under Articles 324 to 329.
A significant, yet controversial, development in election financing was the Electoral Bond Scheme, introduced via the Finance Act, 2017, which notably exempted political parties from disclosing contributions received through these bonds (amendment to RPA 1951, Section 29C proviso). However, on February 15, 2024, the Supreme Court declared the Scheme unconstitutional. Citing the Preamble’s ideals, the Court held that legalizing anonymous donations violated citizens’ Right to Information (Article 19(1)(a)), facilitated corruption and quid pro quo arrangements (Article 21), and fundamentally skewed the “one person, one vote” principle. The ruling underscored that donation secrecy contradicts political equality by favouring wealthy contributors, thereby infringing upon free and fair elections and Article 14 of the Constitution. This paper will also discuss India’s broader election financing system.
Keywords: Accountability, Constitutionalism, Democratic, Electoral Bond, Right to Information.
