Judicial Intervention In Executive Delay: Examining The Role Of The Supreme Court In Protecting State Autonomy
- IJLLR Journal
- Aug 17
- 2 min read
Yashavardhan Pandey, JRF Scholar, Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law Punjab Shailee Mishra, Law Officer, Bank of Baroda
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court's decision on April 8, 2025, concerning the Tamil Nadu Governor's prolonged withholding of assent to ten legislative bills, has brought to the forefront critical discussions on the interplay between constitutional mandates and judicial intervention in India's federal structure. Central to this case are Articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution. Article 200 outlines the Governor's options upon receiving a bill: to grant assent, withhold assent, or reserve it for the President's consideration. Article 201 pertains to the President's role in this process. Invoking Article 142, which empowers the Court to pass orders necessary for complete justice, the Supreme Court instituted binding timelines: a one-month period for the Governor to act on a bill, and a three-month window for the President to decide on reserved bills. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that once a bill is re-passed by the legislature after reconsideration, the Governor is constitutionally obligated to grant assent and cannot reserve it again for the President.
The judgment also highlighted the advisory role of Article 143, suggesting that when a Governor reserves a bill citing unconstitutionality, the President "ought to" seek the Supreme Court's opinion to ensure constitutional compliance. Additionally, Article 145 was pertinent, as it governs the Supreme Court's procedural rules, including the formation of Constitution Benches to deliberate on significant constitutional questions.
This judicial intervention, while aiming to uphold constitutional mandates and prevent executive inaction, has sparked a debate on whether it constitutes judicial activism or overreach. Critics argue that by setting explicit timelines and directing executive actions, the judiciary may be encroaching upon the functions of the executive branch, potentially disrupting the delicate separation of powers. Conversely, proponents assert that such measures are essential to safeguard democratic processes and ensure that constitutional provisions are not rendered ineffective by inaction. This paper thus serves as a critical examination of the judiciary's role in enforcing constitutional duties and maintaining the equilibrium between different branches of government.
