Judicial Review And Amendment Provisions Under The Federal Constitution
- IJLLR Journal
- Sep 6
- 2 min read
Prathamesh Santosh Kulkarni (B.A.LL.B., LL.M. pursuing), Savitribai Phule Pune University, Pune
ABSTRACT
In the battle between protecting constitutional integrity and allowing for necessary legal evolution, judicial review stands as both a shield and a sword. Judicial review, rooted in early constitutional history, emerged as a critical mechanism in the protection of constitutional supremacy in federal systems like USA, India, etc. In the United States, judicial review was solidified in the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison (1803), establishing the courts' authority to invalidate unconstitutional laws. Similarly, in India, the Basic Structure Doctrine (1973) evolved to limit amendments to the Constitution. Despite differences in legal contexts, these countries have adopted judicial review to maintain constitutional order, ensuring legislative and executive actions align with the fundamental law. However, the power to amend the constitution creates a tension between judicial oversight and legislative authority. While amendments allow constitutions to adapt to changing realities, they raise questions about the limits of judicial intervention, especially when constitutional provisions are deemed "unamendable" or "eternal." This paper conducts a comparative study on the relationship between judicial review and amendment provisions under federal constitutions like USA, India, etc. analysing their historical development, current practices, and challenges across different countries. The research problem centers on whether courts should limit their intervention in constitutional amendments, especially when changes challenge established constitutional values. Specifically, it will examine how these systems balance judicial power with legislative authority, and whether judicial review should be applied differently in the context of amendments. The hypothesis suggests that, though judicial review preserves core values of the constitution, it poses constraints on amending process of constitutions, thereby restrains social dynamics. A proposed reform is to establish standardized judicial guidelines for evaluating the constitutionality of amendments. This would help courts decide when to intervene and when to allow amendments, ensuring changes align with the constitution's core values without hindering necessary reforms. The aim of this paper is to provide a comprehensive comparative analysis of judicial review and constitutional amendments in federal systems. The objective is to propose a framework that protects constitutional values while allowing for constitutional adaptability, drawing insights from various legal systems.
Keywords: Judicial Review, Constitutional Amendments, Judicial Oversight, Basic Structure Doctrine, Federal Constitutions, Comparative Constitutional Law.
