One Nation One Election
- IJLLR Journal
- 1 hour ago
- 1 min read
Amritesh Singh, O.P. Jindal Global University
ABSTRACT
The paper looks at the constitutional viability of converting India to the simultaneous Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assembly elections and explores whether such realignment actually is consistent with the federal form and doctrine of the basic structure of the Constitution. It outlines the elements of the constitutional amendments which would be necessary to such a shift, such as that of legislative tenure, of dissolution, of mid-term collapse and examines its interaction with Articles 83, 85, 172, 174, and with the Tenth Schedule.
The paper then evaluates the transitional frameworks, such as the single truncation of the terms of legislature and gradual or gradual mechanisms of alignment and assess whether institutional mechanisms such as constructive votes of no confidence, fixed-term protection and caretaker convention can maintain democratic accountability in an aligned electoral system.
Placing the analysis in the context of the recent reform agenda and ongoing parliamentary discussions of the government, the paper considers the alleged advantages of simultaneity in terms of the governmental costs such as lower election costs and decreased disruption linked with the implementation of the Model Code of Conduct, against the constitutional risks of state autonomy, electoral sensitivity, and representative diversity. It has ended by providing a legally viable route, the process of amendment of Article 368, state ratification, the enabling law, and constitutional protection needed to guarantee that any initiative towards simultaneous elections is not in conflict with the ethos of federal democratic ideals in India.
