Pocket Veto In Federal Systems: A Comparative Study Of Executive Inaction On Legislation In India, The United States, And Canada
Naman Soni, LL.M. (Investments and Securities Laws), National Institute of Securities Markets (NISM), Maharashtra, India
ABSTRACT
A major defect in the federal constitutional design is the absence of action by the executive on legislation, which is popularly known as a “pocket veto”. This paper explores the situation in India, the United States, and Canada. The study is motivated by the Supreme Court's April 2025 ruling in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, which introduced the concepts of ‘deemed assent’ and fixed timelines in Articles 200 and 201. That was the opinion of a Constitution Bench, which reversed it in its November 2025 judgment in the Presidential Reference case.
Using a doctrinal and comparative method, the paper looks at three models. In the United States, the issue is dealt with in constitutional language (in Article I, Section 7), and the courts in that country interpret the adjournment exception in The Pocket Veto Case and Wright v. United States. Canada has inherited the same powers under the Constitution Act, 1867, but has limited them by constitutional convention, and courts have accepted conventions without enforcing them. The Indian Constitution borrowed the power from the Canadian Constitution (Articles 200 and 201), and it has adopted it without the convention.
