Regulating Big Tech In India: Integrating Ex- Ante And Ex-Post Mechanisms Within The Competition Law Framework – A Comparative Perspective
- IJLLR Journal
- 9 hours ago
- 1 min read
Rajib Kumar Das, Ph.D. Research Fellow, Department of Law, The University of Burdwan, West Bengal, India.
ABSTRACT
India’s digital economy, projected to reach USD 1 trillion by 2030, has exposed critical limitations in traditional ex-post competition law enforcement. This article comparatively analyses ex-ante and ex-post regulatory approaches for digital markets, examining implications for India’s competition and consumer protection frameworks. Drawing upon the Competition (Amendment) Act 2023, the proposed Digital Competition Bill 2024, and international experiences the EU’s Digital Markets Act, Germany’s GWB amendments, US antitrust enforcement, and South Korea’s platform regulation this study evaluates India’s regulatory architecture adequacy. Whilst ex-post enforcement under the Competition Act 2002 has achieved notable successes, structural features of digital markets network effects, data accumulation, algorithmic opacity create enforcement challenges that ex-ante regulation may better address. However, the adoption of ex-ante measures raises critical questions about regulatory design, institutional capacity, and the risk of over-regulation stifling innovation. This article argues for a calibrated, complementary approach preserving ex-post enforcement whilst introducing targeted ex-ante obligations for systemically significant digital enterprises, with robust safeguards for consumer protection and competitive market structures.
Keywords: Digital markets, Ex-ante regulation, Ex-post regulation, Digital platforms, Systemically Significant Digital Enterprises (SSDEs), Digital Markets Act (DMA), GWB Section 19a, US antitrust enforcement, South Korea platform regulation.
