Rethinking Merger Control In India: Deal Value Thresholds As A Solution To Killer Acquisitions In The Startup Economy
- IJLLR Journal
- Jan 15
- 1 min read
Vanshita Malhotra & Ananya Mittal, Jindal Global Law School
ABSTRACT
India’s rapidly expanding startup and digital economy has exposed structural limitations in merger control under the Competition Act, 2002, which relies predominantly on asset- and turnover-based thresholds that often fail to capture high-value acquisitions of nascent firms whose competitive significance lies in future innovation potential, data, or network effects. This allows strategically important “killer acquisitions” to evade regulatory scrutiny despite their long-term impact on market contestability. Drawing on comparative experiences from Germany, Austria, the European Union, and OECD guidance on value-based jurisdictional triggers in innovation- driven markets, this paper examines whether the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023's implementation of a deal value threshold, effectively addresses this enforcement gap. It argues that although the deal value threshold is an essential aspect of Indian competition law, the blind adoption of foreign models runs the risk of regulatory overreach and could discourage investment in a startup ecosystem where mergers and acquisitions continue to be the primary means of exit. In order to balance antitrust enforcement with innovation, investment, and economic growth, the paper proposes a balanced hybrid framework that includes procedural safeguards and a local nexus test.
