The Business Of Binge-Watching: Platform Power And The Netflix–Warner Bros. Merger
- IJLLR Journal
- 3 hours ago
- 1 min read
Meher Srivastava, National Law Institute University, Bhopal
ABSTRACT
The acquisition of Warner Bros.’ by Netflix raises important questions for the application of Indian competition law to digital entertainment markets. In the over-the-top sector, competitive advantage is increasingly shaped by control over content, data, and distribution, rather than by price alone. The transaction is assessed under the Competition Act, 2002, with particular attention to the jurisdictional requirements for combinations and the framework for evaluating appreciable adverse effects on competition under Sections 6 and 20.
The analysis situates the merger within the structure of India’s OTT market and examines how the integration of a leading streaming platform with a major content producer may alter competitive conditions across interconnected segments of the audiovisual value chain. It evaluates the significance of premium content ownership, vertical integration, and platform-based characteristics for merger assessment, while recognising that competitive effects may emerge progressively rather than immediately. Attention is also given to the interaction between subscription-based streaming services, advertising-supported models, and theatrical distribution, and to the implications of this interaction for market access and competitive constraints.
Drawing on the statutory factors set out in Section 20(4) of the Competition Act and recent merger control practice of the Competition Commission of India, the discussion highlights the challenges involved in assessing non- price dimensions of competition in data-intensive platform markets. It suggests that reliance on traditional structural indicators alone may be insufficient to capture the full range of competitive risks associated with such transactions.
Keywords: OTT Platforms; Platform Power; Algorithmic Foreclosure; Merger Control
