The Hart-Fuller Debate: Morality And The Nature Of Law
- IJLLR Journal
- May 30
- 1 min read
Jithin S, VELS University
ABSTRACT
The debate between H.L.A. Hart and Lon L. Fuller marks a pivotal moment in legal philosophy, especially regarding the relationship between law and morality. This paper analyzes the core arguments of both scholars, including Hart’s legal positivism and Fuller’s procedural natural law. It further explores the practical relevance of this debate through critical legal cases and its implications in contemporary jurisprudence.
Introduction
The discussion surrounding the intersection of law and morality remains one of the most important themes in jurisprudence. Central to this discourse is the iconic debate between H.L.A. Hart and Lon L. Fuller in the 1950s, primarily ignited by Hart’s positivist interpretation of law as a system of rules, separate from morality, and Fuller’s insistence on law’s inherent moral structure. Their arguments, initially presented through a series of articles and Hart’s influential book The Concept of Law, continue to shape modern legal thought.
Hart’s Legal Positivism: A Rule-Based Theory
H.L.A. Hart revitalized legal positivism by rejecting earlier versions such as John Austin’s command theory. Instead, Hart introduced a nuanced model of law based on a system of rules, categorized into primary and secondary rules.
Primary rules impose duties (e.g., criminal laws), while secondary rules confer powers (e.g., rule of recognition, rule of change, and rule of adjudication).1 Hart emphasized the “rule of recognition” as a fundamental component of legal validity. For Hart, law does not derive its legitimacy from morality but from being accepted by officials as the standard for legal validity.
