When Rules Run Out: Hart's Discretion And Dworkin's Principles
- IJLLR Journal
- Sep 8
- 2 min read
Mallika Kavathekar, BBA LLB, Symbiosis Law School, Hyderabad
ABSTRACT
This essay explores the development of modern legal theory by tracing the move from John Austin's "command theory" to H.L.A. Hart's "rule of recognition," and finally to Ronald Dworkin's theory of "law as integrity." The central question is whether law can be fully understood as a system of social rules, separate from morality, or whether principles of justice and fairness are part of law itself. The first part of the essay explains the main ideas of Austin's command theory and why it was considered inadequate. Austin described law as the command of a sovereign, backed by sanctions. While simple, this account failed to explain constitutional law, the persistence of legal rules after a sovereign's fall, and the existence of power-conferring laws such as contracts and wills. The second part turns to Hart, who addressed these problems by distinguishing between primary rules of conduct and secondary rules about how laws are made, changed, and applied. His "rule of recognition" provided a way to identify valid law within a legal system, and his theory seemed to solve Austin's shortcomings. However, Hart also separated law from morality and admitted that in "hard cases," judges have no legal guidance and must use their discretion. The final part considers Dworkin's critique. Dworkin argued that Hart's account was incomplete because it ignored principles that are part of the legal system. He showed that in hard cases, judges do not simply make new law but interpret and apply moral principles already embedded in the legal framework. His examples show how courts rely on deeper principles of justice and fairness to reach decisions. The conclusion of the essay is that Dworkin's model provides a stronger account of law because it explains both rules and principles. By treating law as an interpretive practice that combines legal materials with moral reasoning, Dworkin offers a more complete picture than Hart. This also ensures that judicial decisions are not seen as acts of pure discretion but as reasoned interpretations that protect rights and legitimacy.
