Algorithmic Collusion In Digital Ad Markets Under The Indian Competition Act
- IJLLR Journal
- Mar 29
- 1 min read
Poovarasan R, Jeya Prathiksha M & Arun Karthick T, SRM Institute of Science and Technology, Kattankulathur
ABSTRACT
India's $5 billion digital advertising market increasingly relies on AI-driven real-time bidding (RTB) auctions dominated by Google (45%) and Meta (25%). These algorithms enable algorithmic collusion tacit coordination sustaining supra-competitive CPMs without explicit human agreements challenging the Competition Act, 2002's Section 3 framework designed for traditional cartels. Ezrachi-Stucke's typology (messenger, hub-spoke, predictable agent, self-learning) reveals escalating evidentiary gaps: black- box opacity eliminates communication trails, RTB transparency facilitates perfect monitoring, and Cement Manufacturers' plus-factors test fails against autonomous machine learning.
Doctrinal analysis synthesizes CCI jurisprudence (Samir Agrawal, Google Ad Tech) demonstrating enforcement collapse against RTB velocity. EU TFEU Article 101 "concerted practices" and DMA ex-ante audits offer superior models versus US Sherman Act's explicit agreement barrier. India's Draft Digital Competition Bill lags implementation.
Research interrogates: Section 3 adequacy, evidentiary burdens, global benchmarks, reform pathways. Hypothesis: Ex-post framework obsolete; ex- ante algorithmic audits essential. Recommendations: Section 3(3)(e) "algorithmic coordination" per se violation, reversed proof burdens, CCI AI Forensic Unit. Absent reforms, unchecked collusion risks SME exclusion and consumer welfare losses, entrenching digital gatekeepers' dominance.
Keywords: Algorithmic collusion, Real-time bidding (RTB), Competition Act, 2002 Section 3, Digital advertising market, Ex-ante algorithmic audits.
