Asymmetric Federalism And The Assent Dilemma: Evolving Judicially Manageable Standards For State-Centre Frictions
- IJLLR Journal
- Mar 29
- 2 min read
Divyanshu Bhardwaj, PhD Research Scholar, Chhatrapati Shahu Ji Maharaj University
ABSTRACT
Indian federalism is based on a fragile, almost-federal balance between the Union and the States that make it, a balance that is progressively being disrupted by constitutional friction at the gubernatorial level. This paper is a critical analysis of the current jurisprudence of discretionary powers of the Governor under Article 200 of the Constitution of India, with particular reference to the constitutionally dubious phenomenon of indefinite withholding of assent to State legislative Bills. Placing this problem of assent dilemma in the wider theoretical context of asymmetric federalism, the study examines how the unequal distributions of constitutional power, which was initially aimed at meeting regional diversity, have, however, inadvertently made the execution of the executive oversight more complex and further intensified the Centre-State hostilities. The main point of the research is to thoroughly trace the judicial search of the so-called judicially manageable standards in order to examine and control gubernatorial and presidential inaction, which reached a critical and highly controversial inflection point in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in 2023-2025.
The paper breaks down some of the most significant constitutional decisions, such State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab through an intensive doctrinal, comparative, and analytical approach, and the historic Special Presidential Reference No. 1 of 2025. The results indicate a deep judicial conflict in the quest to reconcile the rigid doctrine of the separation of powers with the democratic demands of dialogic federalism. Although the judiciary first tried to provide strict timelines on the assent process in order to restrict the so-called pocket veto, the next advisory opinion in the Presidential Reference reiterated the strict constitutional boundaries of such judicial interference, denying the idea of the so-called deemed assent but at the same time providing a narrow, highly limited, window of judicial review of the so-called protracted unexplained inaction. Finally, the paper recommends that in order to resolve the assent dilemma, more than just judicial recalibration is needed, and that an institutional revival of constitutional morality, codification of the criteria of reservation, and a dedication to federal comity is necessary in order to protect the legislative autonomy of the States in the Indian complex federal grid.
Keywords: Asymmetric federalism, Article 200, Gubernatorial discretion, Judicially manageable standards, Constitutional morality, Dialogic federalism.
