Cartel Prosecution In India: The Role Of Leniency Programs Shaping The Judiciary And Competition Commission Of India’s Rulings
- IJLLR Journal
- 23 minutes ago
- 1 min read
Athul Ramaswami J S, LL.M (Corporate and Commercial Laws), School of Law, Christ (Deemed to be University), Bengaluru, India
ABSTRACT
Cartels represent one of the most harmful forms of anti-competitive conduct, undermining market fairness by fixing prices, limiting production, and manipulating tenders. Their inherently secretive nature makes them difficult to detect, leading many jurisdictions to adopt leniency programs that incentivize cartel members to disclose information in exchange for reduced penalties. In India, this framework is provided under Section 46 of the Competition Act, 2002 and the CCI (Lesser Penalty) Regulations, 2009. While these measures align India with global best practices, their real-world effectiveness in exposing cartels and shaping judicial outcomes remains debated. This research aims to critically evaluate the role of leniency in Indian cartel enforcement, focusing on the Competition Commission of India’s application of the program and its review by appellate bodies. The objectives are to analyze the statutory framework, examine its application in landmark cases, assess judicial interpretations, and determine its deterrent value. Research gaps persist in understanding the consistency of CCI’s approach, the evidentiary treatment of leniency applications, and whether leniency sufficiently deters collusion. Using a doctrinal and analytical methodology, supported by case studies and comparative insights from the US and EU, this study offers a comprehensive assessment of the working of CCI, judiciary and policy recommendations to strengthen India’s leniency regime.
Keywords: Leniency, Cartel, Competition Commission of India, National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Section 46 of the Competition Act, 2002
