Constitutional Courts And Democratic Backsliding: A Comparative Study Of India And Japan
- IJLLR Journal
- 18 hours ago
- 2 min read
Ritu Govind Chhaddani, Abhinav Education Society's Law College
ABSTRACT
The growing phenomenon of democratic backsliding has emerged as one of the most significant constitutional challenges of the twenty-first century. Across established and emerging democracies, concerns have arisen regarding the gradual weakening of institutional checks and balances, concentration of executive authority, erosion of civil liberties, and declining accountability mechanisms. In this context, constitutional courts occupy a pivotal position as guardians of constitutionalism, entrusted with the responsibility of preserving democratic values and restraining the misuse of public power. This article undertakes a comparative examination of the role of constitutional adjudication in addressing democratic backsliding in India and Japan, two Asian democracies that have adopted distinct constitutional traditions and judicial approaches.
The study investigates how the constitutional frameworks and judicial institutions of these countries have responded to pressures that may threaten democratic governance. India presents a model of robust judicial review, where the Supreme Court has developed innovative constitutional doctrines, most notably the Basic Structure Doctrine, to protect the foundational principles of the Constitution from majoritarian encroachment. Conversely, Japan’s constitutional system is characterised by a more restrained judicial culture, with the Supreme Court exercising its power of constitutional review cautiously and often deferring to legislative and executive judgment. By analysing constitutional provisions, landmark judicial decisions, and contemporary democratic challenges, this article evaluates the extent to which courts can function as effective safeguards against democratic erosion.
The research adopts a doctrinal and comparative methodology, drawing upon constitutional texts, judicial precedents, and scholarly literature to assess the strengths and limitations of judicial intervention in preserving democratic order. The comparative analysis demonstrates that the effectiveness of constitutional courts is shaped not only by formal constitutional powers but also by institutional legitimacy, political context, judicial independence, and public confidence in the rule of law. The article argues that while courts alone cannot prevent democratic decline, they remain indispensable constitutional actors capable of reinforcing democratic resilience when supported by strong legal and institutional foundations. The study contributes to contemporary scholarship on comparative constitutional law by highlighting the diverse ways in which constitutional courts in Asia respond to the challenges posed by democratic backsliding and constitutional governance in an evolving political landscape.
Keywords: Democratic Backsliding; Constitutional Courts; Judicial Review; Constitutionalism; India; Japan; Rule of Law; Basic Structure Doctrine; Judicial Independence; Comparative Constitutional Law.
