Constitutional Governance And Federal Challenges During The N-Cov-19 Pandemic: A Critical Study Of India
- IJLLR Journal
- 2 days ago
- 2 min read
Mr. Satyajit Pattanaik, B.Sc. LL.B. (H) (KIIT), LL.M (NLUO), PGDM (NALSAR), UGC- NET, Lecturer in Law (SSB), Gop College, Gop, Puri, and Ph.D. Research Scholar, P.G. Department of Law, Sambalpur University.
Ms. Diptirekha Mohapatra, M.A., LL.M., MBA, NET, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Law, P.G Department of Law, Sambalpur University.
ABSTRACT
The unprecedented public health emergency precipitated by the outbreak of Novel Corona Virus (N-CoV-19) inflicted a devastating catastrophe upon humanity on a scale seldom witnessed in modern history surpassing in its toll even the darkest moments of atomic warfare and the deadliest natural calamities. At the height of the pandemic, even the most powerful and scientifically advanced nations of the world found themselves ill-equipped and confounded by the viral onslaught, forced to acknowledge the limits of human preparedness in the face of an invisible enemy.
India, notwithstanding its vast administrative apparatus and constitutional framework, was no exception. The country witnessed a relentless surge in infection and mortality rates, ultimately recording over 5.27 lakh deaths attributable to the pandemic. While the Central and State Governments undertook commendable proactive measures in response, the constitutional legitimacy of “HOW” those measures were implemented demands rigorous scholarly scrutiny.
This paper critically examines the Central Government’s controversial recourse to the National Disaster Management Act, 2005 (NDMA) to govern what was, in constitutional terms, a public health crisis, a subject falling exclusively within the State List under Entry-6 of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. By deploying an ordinary law designed for natural and anthropogenic disasters to centralised command and control over COVID-19 governance, the Centre not only strained the constitutional boundaries of federal architecture but also replicated, through executive fiat, effects that are ordinarily permissible only during a formally proclaimed constitutional emergency. The paper argues that such action constituted a colourable exercise of power, systematically undermining State autonomy in a domain the Constitution expressly reserves for the States.
Furthermore, this paper examines how the pandemic response including lockdowns, surveillance measures, and restrictions on movement, religion, and assembly, led to a sweeping curtailment of fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution, ordinarily permissible only through the activation of emergency provisions under Part XVIII. The paper also critically interrogates the continuing legislative inertia in response to the Sarkaria Commission’s recommendations and argues for a constitutional reinterpretation of concepts such as ‘war’, ‘external aggression’, and ‘internal disturbance’ to encompass bio-terrorism and pandemic emergencies. A failure to enact these reforms, this paper warns, will leave India fatally underprepared for the next inevitable public health catastrophe.
Keywords: COVID-19, Pandemic, Epidemic, Emergency Provisions, Constitution of India, War, External Aggression, Internal Disturbance, Disaster, Federalism, NDMA, Bio-War, Bio-Terrorism, Natural Calamity, Anthropogenic Calamity, Fundamental Rights, State List, Public Health Emergency.
