Constitutional Limits On Gubernatorial Assent: A Case Commentary On In Re: Assent, Withholding Or Reservation Of Bills By The Governor And The President Of India
- IJLLR Journal
- Mar 29
- 2 min read
Swathi Krishna K, LLM, KLE Law College, Bengaluru
Introduction
The advisory opinion delivered by the Supreme Court of India in In Re: Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills by the Governor and the President of India marks an important moment in the development of constitutional jurisprudence relating to federal governance and the functioning of constitutional offices in India. The case deals with the constitutional powers of the Governor and the President in the legislative process, particularly with respect to granting assent to Bills passed by State Legislatures.
In the Indian constitutional framework, the Governor plays a crucial role in the legislative procedure of a State. Once a Bill is passed by the State Legislature, it must be presented to the Governor for assent under Article 200 of the Constitution. The Governor may grant assent, withhold assent, return the Bill for reconsideration by the Legislature, or reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President. When a Bill is reserved for the President, Article 201 governs the decision-making process.
Although these provisions outline the procedural role of constitutional authorities in the legislative process, they do not specify any clear timeline within which the Governor or the President must act. This absence of an explicit timeframe has created practical difficulties in the functioning of democratic institutions. In recent years, several State Governments raised concerns regarding delays by Governors in granting assent to Bills passed by their legislatures. In some cases, the Bills remained pending for long periods without any decision being taken.
Such delays raised serious constitutional concerns because they appeared to obstruct the legislative process and undermine the will of the elected representatives of the people. Critics argued that indefinite delay effectively amounts to a “pocket veto,” allowing constitutional authorities to indirectly block legislation without formally rejecting it.
