Constitutional Limits On Regulatory Fee-Making Under Delegated Legislation: A Comparative Study Of SEBI, RBI, TRAI And CERC
Sara Kashikar, Symbiosis Law School Pune
ABSTRACT
With an increasing regulatory state in India, there is also a growing requirement for specialized statutory regulators to monitor complex sectors such as banking, securities, telecommunication, and electricity. Regulatory bodies such as SEBI, RBI, TRAI, and CERC have the power to levy fines and charges by virtue of delegated legislation along with their role as regulatory authorities. Although such fees are usually considered regulatory fees and not taxes, yet there are grave constitutional questions involved regarding their compulsory aspect.
The constitutional limits on the imposition of regulatory fees have been analyzed in this essay, taking into account the excessive delegation principle as well as Articles 14, 19(1)(g), and 265 of the Constitution. The issue is discussed whether or not a statutory regulator with vast regulatory or rulemaking power can determine the amount and form of the fee. The discussion of the principles of law concerning regulatory fees, quid pro quo, undue delegation, and statutory powers, laid down by the Supreme Court in B.S.E. Brokers Forum v. SEBI, Delhi Race Club Ltd. v. Union of India, and most recently in Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India is the main subject of the article. Finally, a comparative analysis of the regulation of SEBI, RBI, TRAI, and CERC has been made.
The article presents a case that regulators do not receive unlimited budgetary power once strict quid pro quo regulations are relaxed. Statutory empowerment, legislative policy, regulation link, proportionality, and process responsibility will still have to be the basis of regulatory fees.
Keywords: Delegated Legislation; Regulatory Fees; Excessive Delegation; Article 265.
