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Crown Without Ballot: The Constitutional Dilemma Of India’s Collegium System




Aditya Sarkar, B.A. LL.B. (Hons.), Bennett University, School of Law


ABSTRACT


One of the most controversial institutional arrangements in the modern constitutional law has been the Indian collegium system. An extraordinary shift of power of appointment out of the executive into the judiciary, it was not established by explicit constitutional text but through the judicial interpretation. Although its advocates explain it as a required process of maintaining judicial independence, its opponents consider it a non- transparent and unaccountable democracy, which allows self-selection by institutions. This paper asserts that the collegium system has a constitutional paradox; it was created so as to safeguard the judiciary against political capture but in so doing has created a crisis of legitimacy of its own. The paper discusses the constitutional history of the appointment of judges by Articles 124 and 217, the historical evolution of the doctrine of the Judges Cases, and the critical analysis of the collegium design on the principles of separation of powers, accountability and democratic legitimacy. It also examines how the National Judicial Appointments Commission was invalidated as a constitutional moment of closure where the Court asserted independence but opposed any substantial structural change. The paper argues that judicial independence, though being a part of the basic structure, cannot be discussed as a licence of institutional exclusiveness. The system in which the guardians of the Constitution practically manage to compose their own system without clear standards or effective accountability cannot be indefinitely maintained in a constitutional democracy. Judicial appointments in India must not rely on judicial monopoly, or executive domination, but a judiciously balanced system which balances independence and constitutional responsibility.


Keywords: Collegium System; Judicial Appointments in India; Judicial Independence; Democratic Legitimacy; Basic Structure Doctrine; Separation of Powers; National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC); Constitutional Governance.



Indian Journal of Law and Legal Research

Abbreviation: IJLLR

ISSN: 2582-8878

Website: www.ijllr.com

Accessibility: Open Access

License: Creative Commons 4.0

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All research articles published in The Indian Journal of Law and Legal Research are fully open access. i.e. immediately freely available to read, download and share. Articles are published under the terms of a Creative Commons license which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

 

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The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors. They do not purport to reflect the opinions or views of the IJLLR or its members. The designations employed in this publication and the presentation of material therein do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the IJLLR.

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