Delegated Legislation And Parliamentary Oversight In India: Balancing Executive Rule- Making And Legislative Control
Vandana Singh, Campus Law Centre, Faculty of Law, University of Delhi
ABSTRACT
The increasing complexity of modern governance has made it difficult for legislatures to personally formulate every rule and regulation required for the implementation of legislation. Consequently, Parliament frequently delegates limited rule-making powers to the executive. Delegated legislation enables administrative flexibility and facilitates the implementation of legislative policy, but it also raises an important constitutional concern: the extent to which the executive may exercise law- making power without undermining legislative supremacy.
The Indian constitutional framework therefore permits delegation while retaining limitations on the transfer of essential legislative functions. Parliamentary committees, particularly the Committee on Subordinate Legislation, provide an important mechanism for scrutinising the exercise of delegated powers. Judicial review provides an additional constitutional safeguard against excessive or ultra vires subordinate legislation.
This paper examines the constitutional basis and limits of delegated legislation in India, the role of parliamentary oversight, particularly through the Committee on Subordinate Legislation, and the principles developed by the Supreme Court. It argues that effective control over delegated legislation requires parliamentary scrutiny and judicial review to operate as complementary mechanisms rather than as substitutes for one another.
Keywords: Delegated Legislation; Subordinate Legislation; Parliamentary Oversight; Committee on Subordinate Legislation; Excessive Delegation; Judicial Review.
