Dialogic Federalism And Constitutional Discretion: Supreme Court’s Verdict On Governors And President’s Powers Over State Legislation (Special Reference No. 1 Of 2025, 2025 INSC 1333)

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Prathamesh Milind Khopkar, LL.B., New Law College, Mumbai

Abhijit Mahadeo Chavan, Assistant Professor, New Law College, Mumbai

ABSTRACT

This judgment by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court addresses one of contemporary India’s thorniest constitutional conundrums: the powers and responsibilities of Governors and the President in the legislative process, especially regarding assenting to, withholding, or reserving bills under Articles 200 and article 201 of the Constitution. The opinion arose out of a Presidential Reference (No. 1 of 2025) under Article 143. It examines in detail the specific options available to Governors and the President, critically revisits recent and older precedents (most notably the 2025 “State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu, (2025) 11 SCC 1501”), and resolves complex doubts regarding judicial timelines, the notion of deemed assent, and the justiciability of constitutional discretionary action. The advisory opinion cements several foundational principles regarding Indian federalism, separation of powers, and cooperative constitutional functioning. Importantly, it safeguards the independence and responsibility of constitutional functionaries while setting limits on both judicial and gubernatorial overreach. The verdict has wide-reaching implications for Centre-State relations, State legislative autonomy, and the broader evolution of Indian constitutional law.

Keywords: Governor’s powers, Presidential assent, Articles 200 and 201, Judicial review and timelines, Indian federalism, and separation of powers.

DIALOGIC FEDERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL DISCRETION- SUPREME COURT’S VERDICT ON GOVERNORS AN.

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