Doctrinal Reinterpretation Of The Right To Die With Dignity - Advancing Recognition For Physician-Assisted Dying For Terminally Ill People Not On Life Support
- IJLLR Journal
- 1 hour ago
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Richa Sinha, National Law School of India University
ABSTRACT
In Common Cause v. Union of India, the Supreme Court of India expanded the contours of Article 21 of the Constitution to read the right to die with dignity into the right to life, thereby legalising passive euthanasia. However, the jurisprudence left a critical fracture by restricting this right exclusively to terminally ill patients on life support, a stance recently reinforced by the Court in Harish Rana v. Union of India. This paper presents a doctrinal critique of this judicial limitation, advocating for the constitutional recognition of physician-assisted dying (PAD) for competent, terminally ill individuals who are not dependent on life-sustaining medical intervention.
Introduction
Where life is blighted at the face of misery and suffering so great that death is preferable over living even for a reasonable psychologically competent person, the Courts have disallowed the deeply personal decision of dying by assistance based on one’s choice, while allowing the decision of dying by omission, which has all the characteristics of assistance, for patients who are terminally ill. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Harish Rana v Union of India is a missed opportunity in recognising these rights.
There are three rights involved at the core of the debate on the right to die with dignity, the right to self-determination, the right to dignity and the preservation of the sanctity of life, all encompassed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and recognised and listed by the Courts in the Common Cause case. This essay relooks into the reinterpretation of the following questions:
