Drawing The Lines: Gerrymandering, Delimitation And The Limits Of Article 324 Of The Constitution Of India
Logeshwaran R & Siva Chandran S, The Central Law College, Salem, Tamil Nadu, India
ABSTRACT
Gerrymandering is usually discussed as an American affliction, yet India's constitutional arrangements carry their own exposure to it. Article 324 gives the Election Commission of India (ECI) superintendence, direction and control over the conduct of elections, but constituency boundaries are drawn by a separate statutory Delimitation Commission whose orders carry the force of law under section 10(2) of the Delimitation Act, 2002 and are shielded by Article 329(a). This paper asks whether Indian law contains an effective check on partisan boundary-drawing. Using doctrinal analysis and a comparison with the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, it argues that the answer has changed in recent years but remains unsatisfactory. Decisions from Meghraj Kothari (1967) to Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (2020), State of Goa v Fouziya Imtiaz Shaikh (2021) and Kishorchandra Chhanganlal Rathod (2024) show the bar of Article 329(a) being read down, although no court has yet said what standard of review applies or when a challenge may be brought. The paper identifies an accountability gap made up of thin statutory criteria, no duty to give reasons, an executive-led appointment process and an uncertain window for challenge. It proposes a narrow, procedural standard of judicial review and a package of statutory reforms, and it places the argument against the events of 2026: the defeat of the Constitution (131st Amendment) Bill and the withdrawal of the Delimitation Bill, 2026, which leave the readjustment that follows the first census after 2026 still to come.
Keywords: gerrymandering; delimitation; Article 324; Article 329(a); Election Commission of India; judicial review; free and fair elections.
