Electoral Federalism At The Grassroots: Constitutional Design And Institutional Independence Of State Election Commissions In India
- IJLLR Journal
- 2 hours ago
- 1 min read
Prof. Dr. R. Thanga Ramani, Principal, Government Law College, Chengalpattu
ABSTRACT
The constitutionalisation of local self government through the Seventy Third and Seventy Fourth Amendments represents a foundational shift in India’s democratic architecture, embedding electoral federalism at the grassroots level. State Election Commissions were conceived as autonomous constitutional bodies entrusted with the superintendence, direction, and control of elections to Panchayats and Municipalities. This paper undertakes a comprehensive doctrinal, institutional, and comparative analysis of the constitutional design and functional independence of State Election Commissions. It interrogates the gap between normative constitutional safeguards and actual operational autonomy by examining judicial pronouncements, administrative practices, and structural constraints. The paper argues that while the constitutional framework provides a robust foundation for independence, persistent institutional dependencies on State governments undermine electoral integrity at the local level. It proposes structural reforms aimed at strengthening appointment mechanisms, financial autonomy, and administrative independence, thereby reinforcing democratic decentralisation and the federal character of India’s electoral system.
Keywords: Electoral Federalism; Grassroots Democracy; State Election Commissions; Panchayati Raj Institutions; Urban Local Bodies; Local Self- Government; Democratic Decentralisation.
