Gig Worker Welfare And Constitutional Federalism In India: Supplementation Or Repugnancy Under The Code On Social Security, 2020?

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Ayush Verma, National Law Institute University, Bhopal

Anshika Kaushik, National Law Institute University, Bhopal

Rishi Mudgal, National Law Institute University, Bhopal

ABSTRACT

The rapid growth of India’s platform-based gig economy has exposed structural gaps in traditional labour regulation. The Code on Social Security, 2020 introduced statutory recognition of gig and platform workers and created a framework for social security schemes funded through aggregator contributions. However, the absence of fully operationalised schemes and contribution rules has generated a regulatory vacuum. In response, several States, including Rajasthan, Karnataka, Telangana, Jharkhand, and Bihar have enacted or proposed dedicated gig worker welfare legislations establishing state welfare boards, transaction-based welfare levies, and grievance redressal mechanisms.

This paper examines whether such state enactments constitute permissible supplementation within the concurrent legislative field or whether they risk constitutional invalidity through repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution of India. Drawing upon the occupied field doctrine and Supreme Court jurisprudence on legislative inconsistency, the study argues that constitutional repugnancy arises only where there is direct and irreconcilable conflict between central and state law. Given the partial operationalisation of the central framework, it is difficult to conclude that Parliament has conclusively occupied the field of gig worker social security.

At the policy level, however, divergent state contribution models, compliance obligations, and welfare delivery mechanisms create regulatory fragmentation in a digitally integrated labour market. The paper concludes that while state laws presently operate as supplementary welfare regimes, long-term coherence requires harmonised central rule-making and cooperative federal coordination to ensure portability, fiscal clarity, and regulatory certainty in India’s evolving platform economy.

Keywords: Gig Economy; Platform Labour Regulation; Social Security Law; Code on Social Security, 2020; Concurrent Legislative Powers; Article 254 of the Constitution of India; Repugnancy Doctrine

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