Impleadment Without Notice: A Pro- Arbitration Step Or A Procedural Slippage?
Harshit Madaan, National Law Institute University, Bhopal
Ananya Gupta, National Law Institute University, Bhopal
Priyansh Shrivastava, National Law Institute University, Bhopal
“Honest men dread arbitration more than they dread lawsuits,”
~Robertson in his History of the Common Law
Introduction
This sentiment continues to resonate with parties caught in the procedural and jurisdictional complexities of modern arbitration. Over time, the arbitral framework has evolved significantly, but questions surrounding notice, consent, and the impleadment of additional parties continue to vex stakeholders and complicate the enforcement of the arbitral process. In a compelling reaffirmation of the centrality of party autonomy and consent in arbitration, the United States Supreme Court in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University2, held that arbitration is fundamentally a matter of contract and cannot be imposed on a party who has not agreed to it.
This jurisprudential anchor is settled in India as well, where it is a well-established principle that arbitration is premised on mutual consent, and ordinarily, only those who are signatories to the arbitration agreement are bound by its terms. However, Indian courts have progressively broadened the ambit of arbitral jurisdiction to include non-signatory parties through the application of doctrines such as the ‘group of companies’ principle and the theory of composite transactions. This expansion has not proceeded along a single track: it has unfolded through two parallel judicial sagas, one concerning who may be bound to arbitrate at all, and the other concerning what procedural formalities must precede their being drawn into the process. This article argues that these two sagas, although doctrinally distinct, have followed a common trajectory, and that their point of convergence is the decision discussed at length below.
