Interplay Between Repugnancy And Federalism Under The Constitution Of India
- IJLLR Journal
- May 28
- 1 min read
Sourav Kr. Singh & Arya Shree, KIIT School of Law
ABSTRACT
The Indian Constitution, though federal in nature, includes important unitary elements that frequently lead to friction between the Union and State legislatures. A fundamental legal principle that exposes this conflict is the doctrine of repugnancy, established in Article 254. This principle deals with instances where a clash occurs between laws enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures in the Concurrent List, leading to the central law taking precedence. This article investigates the relationship between repugnancy and federalism, analysing whether the implementation of Article 254 supports or weakens the federal framework intended by the Constitution. By conducting a doctrinal and case law examination, the paper explores judicial interpretations, the importance of Presidential assent, and real-world examples where this conflict has manifested. It also contemplates how the principle of repugnancy affects the legislative independence of the states, and whether it encourages cooperative federalism or tends to central supremacy. Comparative perspectives from different federal systems offer context and distinction. The article ends with recommendations for recalibrating legislative authorities to maintain the core of Indian federalism.
Keywords: Indian Constitution, Doctrine of Repugnancy, Federalism, Article 254, Concurrent List, Central-State Relations, President’s Assent, Quasi-Federalism, Judicial Interpretation, Cooperative Federalism.
