Judicial Paternalism And Reproductive Autonomy: A Critical Analysis Of Indian Judicial Approach Towards Women With Intellectual Disabilities
- IJLLR Journal
- Aug 13
- 2 min read
Saloni Tyagi, Research Scholar, Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur
Dr. Rajput Shraddha Bhausingh, Assistant Professor, Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur
ABSTRACT
The reproductive choices of women are protected as human rights, which refer to the autonomy of making decisions regarding their reproductive choices, such as whether to procreate or not, family planning, access to healthcare services, etc. The reproductive choices of women with intellectual disabilities (hereinafter referred to as WID) have lately gained momentum as acknowledged by the Indian Constitution under Article 21 and legislative enactments such as the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, and the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971, as amended in 2021, yet are displaced by judicial paternalism coated in the “best interests” doctrine. The authors in this paper have critically examined the approach taken by the Indian Judiciary towards the reproductive autonomy of WID. The evolution of the judicial approach can be traced back to the landmark decision in Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration (2009), and the jurisprudence of reproductive rights was expanded in X v. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department (2022). From Z vs. State of Bihar (2017), where medical authorities went beyond the law and denied the termination of pregnancy to a 35-year-old mentally retarded rape survivor without the consent of her guardians, and recently, the Karnataka High Court’s judgment permitted a hysterectomy on a 23-year-old woman with severe intellectual disability at her parents’ request without even following the process of supported decision-making. The authors in this paper argue that despite progressive constitutional interpretation of reproductive autonomy under Article 21, the Indian judiciary continues to apply a paternalistic “best interests” principle which substitutes the will of WID, which is both constitutionally suspect and incompatible with India’s obligations under Articles 12 and 23 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 2006. The paper further examines the legislative framework, the conflict between substituted and supported decision-making models, and concludes with concrete recommendations for a rights-based judicial framework anchored in individual capacity assessment and supported decision-making.
Keywords: Reproductive Rights, Intellectual Disability, Judicial Paternalism, Article 21, Supported Decision-Making.
