Judicial Review As A Mechanism For Political Accountability: Constitutional Perspectives In India
- IJLLR Journal
- Mar 16
- 2 min read
Ritu Singh, LLM (Constitution), Department of Law, Amity University, Lucknow
Dr. Kavya Chandel, Assistant Professor, Department of Law, Amity University, Lucknow
ABSTRACT
This paper examines judicial review in India as a constitutional mechanism that advances political accountability in a majoritarian parliamentary democracy. Although the Constitution does not use the phrase “judicial review,” it entrenches the power through Articles 13, 32, 226 and related jurisdictional provisions that authorize the Supreme Court and High Courts to test legislation, executive action, delegated legislation and constitutional amendments against constitutional limits. Tracing doctrinal development from early deference in Shankari Prasad and Sajjan Singh, through the rights- protective turn in Golaknath, to the settlement in Kesavananda Bharati, the paper shows how the basic structure doctrine reconciles parliamentary amendment power with constitutional supremacy. It further highlights how Emergency-era and post-Emergency decisions - Indira Nehru Gandhi, Minerva Mills and L. Chandra Kumar -operationalized accountability by resisting immunities, preserving free elections and protecting the courts’ writ jurisdiction as part of the Constitution’s basic structure. Normatively, the paper argues that judicial review performs both protective and corrective functions: it shields fundamental rights and enforces rule-of-law disciplines (reasoned decision-making, legality, proportionality and procedural fairness) that compel political branches to justify coercive choices. At the same time, it acknowledges persistent criticisms, counter-majoritarian concerns, institutional competence, delay and politicization, and suggests that calibrated standards of review and remedial restraint can preserve democratic space while maintaining constitutional guardrails. Overall, judicial review emerges as an indispensable accountability device that stabilizes India’s constitutional order by subordinating transient political majorities to enduring constitutional commitments. It also situates public interest litigation and continuing mandamus as pathways that translate constitutional promises into enforceable duties for the state.
Keywords: Judicial Review; Political Accountability; Constitution of India; Fundamental Rights; Article 13; Article 32; Article 226; Basic Structure Doctrine; Separation of Powers; Rule of Law; Constitutional Amendments; Public Interest Litigation.
