Judicial Rule By Stealth: Constitutional Implications Of The Expanding Jurisdiction Of The Indian Judiciary
- IJLLR Journal
- May 26
- 1 min read
Shambhunath Yadiyapur, Gujarat National Law University, Silvassa
ABSTRACT
Independent Judicial Review is a core component of constitutionalism. Sustaining this judicial autonomy mandates its insulation from populist influence, although some jurisdictions such as USA practice democratic judicial appointments. The Indian justice system is constitutionally designed to be an adjudicatory and advisory body, anything otherwise could be extraconstitutional. The separation of powers, as envisaged by the constitution, is qualified rather than absolute, enabling inter-institutional dialogue between the organs of the state. This constitutional structure is disturbed by ever expanding judicial jurisdiction in absence of a constituent sanction. This article shall examine the implications of judicial law-making; Judicial legislation may manifest either in active form with by judicial law- making or it may be in passive form by judicial veto of legislative or executive actions. Through repeated extraconstitutional interventions, the practice of judicial legislation may effectively legitimise the judicial usurpation of legislative and executive space. This article would also examine the principal repercussions of judicial construction of doctrines explicitly untraceable in the constitution such as the doctrine of constitutional morality. This article would be a doctrinal study aimed to explore the phenomenon in light of recent municipal developments. This research seeks to evaluate the constitutionally permissible scope of judicial review, the potential dilution of separation of power doctrine and the impact of judicial intrusion outside its domain on democratic governance in India.
Keywords: Judicial Review, Electoral Democracy, Judicial overreach, Judicial Legislation, juristocracy.
