Modification Of Arbitral Award: A Pragmatic Approach Adopted By The Supreme Court?
- IJLLR Journal
- 1 hour ago
- 1 min read
Advocate Ranjan Babu Joseph
ABSTRACT
The question of whether courts possess the power to modify arbitral awards under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has long been debated in Indian arbitration jurisprudence. The statute, modeled on the UNCITRAL Model Law, deliberately limits judicial intervention and does not expressly provide for modification of arbitral awards, unlike the earlier Arbitration Act, 1940. Judicial precedent initially reinforced this restrictive approach, emphasizing that courts may only set aside an award and not alter its substance. However, recent judicial developments—particularly the Constitution Bench decision in Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd. have revisited this position. By adopting the principle that the greater power to set aside includes the lesser power to modify, the Supreme Court recognized limited circumstances in which modification may be justified to avoid unnecessary re-arbitration and prolonged litigation. This article examines the evolution of judicial interpretation on this issue, analyzes the reasoning of the majority and minority opinions, and evaluates the implications of allowing modification of arbitral awards within the Indian arbitral framework. While the Court’s approach seeks to promote efficiency and pragmatism, the article argues that expanding judicial powers risks undermining the core principles of party autonomy, minimal judicial intervention, and finality that underpin modern arbitration law.
