One Nation, One Election: Assessing The Balance Between Governance Efficiency And Representative Federalism
- IJLLR Journal
- Sep 30
- 1 min read
Asif Iqbal, Assistant Professor, University School of Law, Rayat Bahra University, Mohali
Neeraj Kumar Jaiswal, Assistant Professor, School of Legal Studies, Babu Banarasi Das University, Lucknow
ABSTRACT
The debate surrounding One Nation, One Election (ONOE) raises a central question: can electoral efficiency be harmonized with the federal principles enshrined in the Indian Constitution? Supporters of the proposal emphasize its potential to cut election-related expenditure, reduce the recurrent disruption of governance caused by frequent polls, and ensure continuity in public policy. At the same time, apprehensions remain that simultaneous elections could encourage excessive centralization, weaken the autonomy of states, and constrain the political space for regional and minority voices— factors essential to India’s democratic pluralism.
This study examines ONOE through a combined framework of federal theory, governance efficiency, and institutional design. It engages with comparative experiences, noting that South Africa and Sweden employ synchronized cycles, whereas Canada and Australia deliberately preserve staggered elections to uphold provincial authority. The paper also analyzes leading constitutional decisions—S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, and People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India—to evaluate whether ONOE aligns with the Constitution’s basic structure, particularly federalism and free elections. The analysis concludes that ONOE, if considered, should be introduced incrementally with robust safeguards and consensus-building, ensuring efficiency does not override representative federalism.
Keywords: One Nation One Election, Governance Efficiency, Representative Federalism, Constitutional Law, Electoral Reforms
