Principles Of Delegated Legislation In India: A Case Study
- IJLLR Journal
- 3 days ago
- 2 min read
Mohd Ammaar, Jamia Millia Islamia Baby Fatma, Jamia Millia Islamia
Introduction
“Subordinate Legislation is that which proceeds from any authority other than the sovereign power”
....Sir John Salmond
The contemporary administrative state, with its expanding duties and complexities of modern governance, increasingly depends upon the exercise of delegated legislation. The Parliament, in order to meet the demands of good governance, often transfers to the executive or administrative agencies the authority to create rules, regulations, and orders that give detailed effect to legislative intent. While this ensures flexibility, responsiveness, and administrative efficiency, it simultaneously raises a constitutional dilemma: the tension between democratic accountability and administrative necessity. The very premise of a democratic system is that laws are enacted by a body directly responsible to the people through their elected representatives. When such law-making authority is conferred upon unelected officials, the doctrine of separation of powers and the principle of representative responsibility appear to be undermined.
Delegated or subordinate legislation refers to the transfer of legislative authority by the legislature to the executive or other subordinate bodies, empowering them to make rules and regulations within the framework of a parent statute. These bodies are not empowered to enact primary laws but can frame detailed provisions necessary for implementing legislative policy. In the 21st century characterised by industrialisation, technological advancement, and complex social structures, delegated legislation has become indispensable, facilitating timely adaptation of laws to emerging needs and thereby reducing the legislative workload. This pragmatic necessity, however, must be weighed against the constitutional imperative of maintaining the rule of law and the integrity of legislative power.
The Constitution of India does not explicitly authorise delegated legislation, yet it permits it by implication through its structural design of separation of powers and checks and balances. Articles 245 and 246 confer legislative competence upon Parliament and State Legislatures, while the judiciary interprets and enforces the limits of such delegation. The Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) reaffirmed that the separation of powers and supremacy of the Constitution constitute part of the basic structure of the Constitution, thereby restraining any branch from encroaching upon the essential functions of another. Nonetheless, delegation of legislative power is not a post-independence innovation. It was practised during the colonial era, when the Crown or the Governor-General issued regulations and orders later ratified by the British Parliament or the Privy Council, functioning as early forms of delegated legislation in India.
