The Indian Regulatory State And The Limits Of Administrative Law: Judicial Control Over Statutory Regulators
- IJLLR Journal
- Mar 19
- 2 min read
Ariba Khan, National Law Institute University, Bhopal
Ali Asghar, National Law Institute University, Bhopal
Introduction
The transformation of India’s economic governance since the liberalisation reforms of 1991 has been accompanied by the emergence of a complex regulatory framework administered by specialised statutory authorities. Prior to economic liberalisation, regulation was largely exercised through direct governmental control, extensive licensing mechanisms, and centralized administrative decision-making. As markets expanded and private participation increased across sectors such as telecommunications, electricity, and securities markets, the traditional model of state control proved increasingly inadequate to address the technical and institutional demands of a modern market economy. In response, the Indian state gradually adopted the institutional architecture of the regulatory state, establishing independent regulatory authorities designed to supervise markets, enforce compliance, and promote competition.
These statutory regulators were conceived as expert bodies operating with a degree of autonomy from the executive, and they were entrusted with extensive powers encompassing rule-making, licensing, supervision, and adjudication. The concentration of legislative, executive, and quasi-judicial functions within a single institutional framework, however, raises important questions regarding accountability, transparency, and the limits of delegated authority. While regulatory independence is often justified on the grounds of expertise and efficiency, it simultaneously generates concerns about democratic oversight and the potential for regulatory overreach.
Within this context, judicial review under administrative law has emerged as one of the principal mechanisms through which courts attempt to maintain a balance between regulatory autonomy and legal accountability. Yet the effectiveness of judicial oversight over regulatory authorities remains uneven. Indian courts have traditionally exercised closer scrutiny over quasi-judicial decisions affecting individual rights, while displaying greater deference toward regulatory rule-making and policy-oriented decisions involving technical expertise. This differential approach raises an important question regarding the extent to which existing administrative law doctrines are capable of meaningfully constraining the broad powers exercised by modern regulatory authorities.
