Tribunal Independence Beyond Adjudication: Evaluating The National Tribunals Commission Under The Tribunals Reforms Act, 2026
Vishnu S Mullappally & Lutufiya M Azeez, Sree Narayana Law College, Poothotta (Affiliated to Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam)
ABSTRACT
The Tribunals Reforms Act, 2026 represents the latest legislative response to a long-running constitutional dispute concerning the independence, administration and functioning of tribunals in India. The Act repeals the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 and establishes a National Tribunals Commission (NTC) entrusted with functions relating to tribunal appointments, performance review, disciplinary oversight and the National Tribunals Data Grid. This article argues that the constitutional significance of the 2026 framework lies not merely in the creation of a new coordinating institution, but in whether the institutional architecture of tribunal administration has been sufficiently insulated from executive influence. The article examines the composition and appointment of the NTC, the search- cum-selection mechanism for tribunal members, the role of the Central Government, the Commission's Secretariat, tenure and reappointment, and the relationship between administrative accountability and adjudicatory independence. It situates the 2026 Act within the Supreme Court's tribunal jurisprudence, particularly L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, Union of India v. R. Gandhi, Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd., and the 2025 decision in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India. The article concludes that the Act is a substantial structural improvement because it creates a permanent, judicially weighted institutional mechanism; however, the continuing role of the executive in appointments and administration means that institutional independence remains a matter of design and implementation rather than a completed constitutional achievement.
