Anti-Defection Law Cannot Be Reduced To A Mere Arithmetic Exercise: A Constitutional Reappraisal
Suhail Farooq Khan, Assistant Professor of Law, KCEF Law College, Pulwama, J&K
ABSTRACT
The anti-defection law under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India is frequently interpreted through the lens of legislative arithmetic, particularly the assumption that the support of two-thirds of a legislature party automatically legitimises defections. This essay challenges that understanding. It argues that the constitutional scheme governing defection is fundamentally concerned with preserving electoral mandates, maintaining party integrity, and ensuring political stability rather than validating shifts in legislative numbers. Drawing upon the text of the Tenth Schedule, its legislative history, and judicial interpretation, the essay highlights the constitutional distinction between a political party and its legislature party. It contends that the merger exception under Paragraph 4 is a narrowly crafted safeguard intended to accommodate genuine organisational realignments of political parties and not factional defections supported by numerical strength within legislatures. The article further argues that treating the two-thirds requirement as a standalone constitutional rule risks reviving the logic of the abolished split provision and undermining the normative foundations of the anti-defection regime.
Keywords: Anti-Defection Law; Tenth Schedule; Political Party; Legislature Party; Merger; Constitutional Law.
