Case Commentary: Inventing Nature In “Association For Molecular Pathology V Myriad Genetics”
Vishakha Agarwal, Jindal Global Law School, O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat
Introduction
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in “Association for Molecular Pathology v Myriad Genetics (2013) 569 US 576” marks a paradigmatic moment in intellectual property jurisprudence, not merely for its outcome but for its philosophical audacity. The Court’s categorical declaration that “a naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of nature and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated” seems, at first glance, to champion the boundaries of human creativity against the encroachment of corporate monopolisation. Yet, beneath this rhetorical understanding of nature’s autonomy lies a doctrinal ambiguity: where does nature end and human invention begin?
The “Myriad” judgment is not simply a matter of patent eligibility; it interrogates the ontology of invention itself. In attempting to disentangle discovery from creation, the Court reenacted the ancient legal dilemma between natural right and artificial law —the law of what exists and the law of what is made. However, in choosing to deify nature and discredit the inventive act of isolation, the judgment risks reducing innovation to metaphysics.
The Court’s Reasoning
Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous bench, reaffirmed that “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable under “35 U.S.C. Section 101”. The Court created a distinction between genomic DNA (gDNA), which merely exists in nature, and complementary DNA (cDNA), which, being synthetically produced, is patent eligible. This reasoning, while doctrinally anchored in “Diamond v Chakrabarty (1980) 447 US 303”, represents a selective and, arguably, philosophically inconsistent application of precedent.
