Commission Of Inquiry: Fact-Finding Body Or Political Instrument? A Critical Legal Analysis
Farhana Banu S, The Central Law College, Salem
ABSTRACT
The Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 empowers the Central and State Governments to appoint Commissions of Inquiry to investigate matters of definite public importance. These commissions are intended to function as independent fact-finding bodies that uncover the truth, identify administrative failures, and recommend corrective measures. Although they possess several powers of a civil court, their findings are generally recommendatory in nature and are not legally binding on the Government. This has led to an important legal and constitutional debate regarding their effectiveness and independence. This article critically examines whether Commissions of Inquiry in India truly serve as impartial mechanisms for discovering facts and promoting public accountability or whether they have increasingly become political instruments used to delay action, influence public opinion, or target political opponents. The study analyses the statutory framework under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, the powers and limitations of such commissions, and the constitutional principles governing their functioning. It also evaluates landmark judicial decisions, including Rama Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar, State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, and M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India, to understand the judicial approach towards the appointment, powers, and scope of inquiry commissions.
The article further explores the practical challenges faced by Commissions of Inquiry, including executive control over their appointment, delay in submission of reports, non-implementation of recommendations, lack of enforceability, and concerns regarding political bias. It argues that while these commissions have played a significant role in investigating issues of public importance, their credibility depends upon independence, transparency, procedural fairness, and timely implementation of their recommendations.
The study concludes that meaningful reforms are necessary to strengthen the legal framework governing Commissions of Inquiry. It recommends ensuring greater institutional independence, prescribing fixed timelines, enhancing parliamentary oversight, and introducing mechanisms for mandatory governmental response to commission reports. Such reforms would enable Commissions of Inquiry to function as effective instruments of public accountability rather than merely political tools.
Keywords: Commission of Inquiry, Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, FactFinding, Political Accountability, Public Interest, Executive Discretion, Judicial Review, Natural Justice, Rule of Law.
