Competing Algorithms And Collusive Outcomes: Rethinking Antitrust Liability In India
- IJLLR Journal
- Jun 13
- 1 min read
Divyansh Sonwani, B.A. LL.B. (Hons.), Law College Dehradun, Uttaranchal University Dehradun, Uttarakhand, India
ABSTRACT
The emergence of AI-driven pricing algorithms has fundamentally reshaped competitive markets, creating efficiencies while simultaneously raising concerns of algorithmic collusion. Unlike traditional cartels, algorithmic coordination may occur without explicit communication, enabling firms to reach supracompetitive outcomes through automated and self-learning systems. This article examines whether India’s competition law framework, particularly Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002, is equipped to address such technologically mediated conduct. By analysing Indian jurisprudence and drawing comparative insights from the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the article highlights the doctrinal limitations of an enforcement regime rooted in concepts of agreement and human intent. It argues for a more adaptive approach that emphasizes foreseeability, algorithmic design, and corporate oversight in assessing antitrust liability. The article concludes that modernizing competition law to address algorithm-enabled coordination is essential to preserving market integrity while fostering technological innovation.
