From Confession To Detection: Rethinking India’s Leniency Regime And The Future Of Cartel Detection
Ariba Khan, National Law Institute University, Bhopal
Sarga P.S., National Law Institute University, Bhopal
ABSTRACT
Cartels pose a unique enforcement challenge because they are designed to operate in secrecy, making detection, rather than prohibition, the central difficulty for competition authorities. This paper examines India’s leniency regime under Section 46 of the Competition Act, 2002, and its recent evolution into “leniency plus” through the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023 and the Competition Commission of India (Lesser Penalty) Regulations, 2024. Tracing the statutory framework governing cartels, the paper analyses key CCI decisions to show how the leniency mechanism has developed in practice, and situates this evolution within a comparative study of the United States and European Union models. The paper then critically evaluates the leniency plus regime against the standards of deterrence, predictability, and institutional capacity, identifying persistent weaknesses in penalty credibility, definitional clarity, confidentiality protection, and personal liability. It concludes with targeted suggestions, including clearer guidelines, stronger confidentiality safeguards, and dedicated whistleblower protection to make voluntary disclosure a genuinely rational strategy for cartel participants in India.
