Pandemics And Government Liability: Can The State Be Sued For Negligence?
- IJLLR Journal
- Apr 15, 2025
- 1 min read
Mahi Chopra, IILM, Institute of Integrated Learning in Management University, Gurugram
ABSTRACT
Government actions during pandemics have a significant impact on public health, economic stability, and the population’s rights. This paper questions the extent to which the Indian government can be held liable for negligence in handling pandemics. It examines legal principles such as sovereign immunity, exceptions to the discretionary power, and constitutional obligations.
The basis of the principle of sovereign immunity, grounded in the common law doctrine that “the king can do no wrong,” is that the governments have been free from liabilities for a long time. The courts, by contrast, have found that gross negligence or administrative failure constitutes a particular kind of mischief and, therefore, have come to the view that such a phenomenon exists in societies worldwide, including India. Unlike the United States’ Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) or the United Kingdom’s Crown Proceedings Act, 1947, which outlines state liability, India does not have a uniform statutory framework for managing government negligence. Court statements, particularly in public health emergencies, have been trying to address this issue by holding the state accountable under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
This research also investigates the role of judicial review in pandemic governance, delving into the debated topic of whether the judiciary should interfere in executive decisions. This study suggests possible reforms to government liability while preserving the state’s capabilities to respond effectively in public health crises. With the help of India’s case studies, the paper analyses the idea of qualified immunity and state compensation mechanisms as possibilities of reforms.
Keywords: sovereign immunity, negligence, pandemic, government liability, state compensation.
