Unequal Bargaining Power In Land Transactions: A Civil Law Analysis Of Exploitative Property Agreements In India
- IJLLR Journal
- 11 minutes ago
- 1 min read
Akanksha Santosh Thorat, ILS Law College, Pune
1. ABSTRACT
Indian land transactions increasingly manifest significant disparities in contractual bargaining power. Economically dominant entities—developers, intermediaries, and organized land dealers—leverage their advantageous positions against vulnerable landowners, encompassing impoverished farmers, illiterate individuals, minors, distressed parties, and marginalized societal groups, who possess limited recourse. This asymmetry facilitates the imposition of inequitable contractual terms, distorted valuations, and exploitative agreements favouring the dominant party. While such transactions may formally satisfy civil law consent requirements, consent is frequently vitiated by economic duress, inadequate awareness, and informational asymmetry. This article examines unequal bargaining power in Indian land transactions within the civil law framework, analyzing doctrines of free consent, undue influence, and unconscionability. Employing a doctrinal methodology, the study evaluates judicial responses and highlights the inadequacy of current safeguards. It concludes by advocating for preventive mechanisms and legal reforms to ensure substantive, rather than merely formal, consent in property transactions.
2. Keywords: Unequal Bargaining Power, Land Transactions, Exploitative Property Agreements, Free Consent, Undue Influence, Unconscionable Contracts, Vulnerable Landowners
