Quasi-Federal Or Unitary: The Structural Implications Of Simultaneous Elections On The Indian Constitution
- IJLLR Journal
- 40 minutes ago
- 1 min read
Dr. Jyoti Yadav, Assistant Professor, Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow
Vishal Patel, LL.M. Student, Amity Law School, Amity University Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow
ABSTRACT
The submission of the High-Level Committee Report in 2024 has reignited the debate on “One Nation, One Election”, creating a tension between administrative utility and constitutional morality.This research finds whether synchronizing electoral cycles alters or change India’s constitutional identity from a “quasi-federal” structure to a centralized unitary system. While supporters argue that One Nation One Election reduces the public expenditure and policy stagnation caused by the Model Code of Conduct, critics argue that it clashes with the Federal Principle, which is a basic structure of Indian Constitution.The study analyses structural implications as presented by critique and supporters like the loss of state autonomy where regional election cycles become dependent on the Lok Sabha’s timeline, and the “coattail effect,” where national issue overshadow local issues. Further, this paper also analyse the financial logic of the proposed re-election for remainder term, arguing it may result in an inefficient cost model. The paper conclude that the current proposal risks centralizing power and suggests that any implementation must provide the balance administrative efficiency with the preservation of federal checks and balances.
Keywords: One Nation One Election, Federalism, Basic Structure, Coattail Effect, Simultaneous Elections, Constitution.
