The Role Of Public Regulation And Theories Of Corporate Information Disclosure: A Dichotomous Approach To Corporate Information Disclosure And Insider Dealing Regulation
- IJLLR Journal
- Jun 8
- 1 min read
John Musonda
Counsel Collins Nkumbwa, Esq.CIP (NIPA), LLB (UNZA), LLM (UNZA), AHCZ, ASCZ, PhD Cand. Advocate, Lecturer of law and Commissioner of Oaths
ABSTRACT
This article examines the role which the theories of corporate disclosure and public regulation play in ensuring effective corporate disclosure regulation. The article makes a case for public regulation, arguing that the public nature of material information lends support to the view that neglect or failure to publish material information should be enforced through the public machinery rather than through private orderings alone. The article further contends that effective corporate information disclosure and insider dealing regulation requires both robust public enforcement and complementary private enforcement mechanisms. Through an analysis of the Capital Cost Reduction Theory, the Liquidity Enhancement Theory, and the Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure, this article demonstrates that incorporating these theories into the legal framework is likely to result in more effective regulation of corporate information disclosure and insider dealing, thereby promoting market cleanliness, transparency, and investor confidence.
Keywords: corporate disclosure, insider dealing, public regulation, securities market, market integrity, Zambia, Efficient Market Hypothesis.
