Anti-Defection Law And Constitutional Morality: Rethinking The Tenth Schedule In Light Of The Maharashtra Crisis And Recurring Defections Across The States
Roshan Mathew, LLM, National University of Advanced Legal Studies, Kochi, Kerala
ABSTRACT
The anti-defection law was written into the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution in 1985 to stop legislators from treating a seat won on one party's ticket as a tradeable asset once the wider electoral mandate behind it had been secured. This article analyzes the extent to which that goal continues to be relevant when measured against the principles of constitutional morality, which the Supreme Court has increasingly referenced since the case of Manoj Narula v. Union of India to outline the expected conduct of constitutional officials in the absence of specific legal requirements. It follows the history of the Tenth Schedule's drafting, the judicial interpretation of constitutional morality from the Naz Foundation ruling to Navtej Singh Johar, and the court precedents on defection that span from Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu to Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly. The Subhash Desai ruling, the Maharashtra crisis from 2022 to 2024, and the concurrent divisions within the Nationalist Congress Party, Karnataka, and Madhya Pradesh are then discussed. These examples show how the Schedule's original intent has been undermined by resignations, the two-thirds merger approach, and delays caused by a Speaker dependent on the majority he oversees. The article concludes by pointing out the particular weaknesses that this pattern reveals and repeating the long-standing argument in favour of an impartial adjudicatory body, a legally binding deadline, and statutory regulation of internal party democracy.
Keywords: Anti-defection law, Tenth Schedule, constitutional morality, Speaker's adjudicatory power, Maharashtra political crisis, Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, party splits and mergers, judicial review, electoral reform.
