From Constitutional Silence To Constitutional Supremacy: The Supreme Court's Reinvention Of Articles 200 And 201 In State Of Tamil Nadu V Governor Of Tamil Nadu
- IJLLR Journal
- 1 hour ago
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Neha Saini, B.A. LL.B. (Hons.), Maharshi Dayanand University Centre for Professional and Allied Studies (MDU-CPAS), Gurugram
Bharat Bhushan, B.A. LL.B. (Hons.), Maharshi Dayanand University Centre for Professional and Allied Studies (MDU-CPAS), Gurugram
I. INTRODUCTION
What happens when a constitution assigns an act to an authority who simply refuses to perform it? Article 200 answers this for the Governor's assent to State Bills by prescribing three courses of action and, on the Court's reading, no fourth. Yet for a prolonged period, the Governor of Tamil Nadu treated silence as a permissible course of conduct, and when he eventually acted, he did so in ways the Court held were not sanctioned by the text, first withholding assent without the reconsideration message the Constitution requires, then reserving re-passed Bills for presidential consideration a second time. Confronted with this pattern, the Supreme Court, invoking Article 142, directed that the ten Bills at the centre of the dispute be treated as having received the Governor's assent.
That remedy is the focus of this note. Existing commentary on State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu has largely engaged with the political theatre of Centre-State confrontation. This note asks a narrower and more consequential question: was the deemed-assent order an extraordinary constitutional remedy properly fashioned to complete justice, or did the Court, in performing an act the text commits to the Governor, substitute itself for that constitutional authority? That inquiry, rather than the merits of the Governor's conduct, is this note's central concern.
The argument advanced is this: the judgment is at once a landmark affirmation of responsible government and, it is submitted, among the most consequential deployments of Article 142 yet seen in Centre-State relations. It resolves the immediate deadlock on its particular facts. It does not resolve, and perhaps cannot resolve, the deeper question of what remedies survive when constitutional actors default and no outcome besides the one directed by the Court remains available. That unresolved residue, not the result itself, is where this judgment's lasting significance arguably lies.
