Learning Resources V. Trump: Why The Decision Is Necessary For Congress To Reclaim Its Article I Powers
Aarya Sanjiv Singh, Associate Trainee at INDIALAW LLP
ABSTRACT
This article analyses how the United States Supreme Court’s rulings in Learning Resources et. al. v. Trump et al and Trump et al v V.O.S. Selections may shape trade policy by delving deep into the constitutional history of Congress’s tariff-setting authority and its delegation to the executive. This article assesses the legality of Presidential tariffs under Executive Order 14257 by drawing parallels from emergencies in 1974 and 1997, noting the judiciary’s differing views while deciding whether these surcharges were a valid exercise of executive power. While identifying the gaps in legislative oversight over the broad and unfettered presidential powers under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) this article explores the constitutional principles of intelligible delegation and non- delegation through judicial precedents, which trace Congress’s legislative function to impose and collect taxes back to the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809 and the delegation of this function to the Customs and Administrative Act of 1890. Distinguishing itself from the existing literature on this topic, this article focuses on looking past Yoshida International’s Case and comments on how the upcoming decisions in consolidated challenges to these tariffs will provide a single interpretive rule on the major question about whether the President has the statutory authority under the IEEPA to impose tariffs as a means of regulating foreign commerce. After identifying the ambiguity in the language of IEEPA, granting vaguely broad powers of investigation and assessment of import investigating powers under legislations like the Tariff Act of 1930 and the Trade Expansion Act of 1974. Further, the article critiques the lack of judicial clarity on the use of peacetime tariffs while suggesting that the United States Supreme Court empower Congress to reclaim its constitutional authority. Lastly, in its concluding arguments, the article emphasises the need for the United States Supreme Court to move away from its wartime understanding of Presidential authority to regulate imports and foreign commerce by imposing tariffs to help Congress reclaim its constitutional authority by guiding it in effectively exercising legislative oversight over executive actions.
Keywords: Regulating & Investigating Imports, Emergency, Peacetime tariffs and IEEPA, Intelligible delegation, Non-delegation, Doctrine of Major Questions.
